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1986, pp. 253.
"The world is still deceived with ornament."
-The Merchant of Venice
Act III, Scene ii
Recent periodicals as well as current television and radio news
announcements are rife with the developing Wall Street stock trading scandals. Such events are not mere aberrations, particularly
with arbitrager Ivan Boesky being fined $100,000,000 in a "compromise" settlement, the Levine Scandal, "Yuppie" Inside Traders, and
the most recent scandal at prestigious Goldman-Sachs.' Moreover,
multiple subpoenas have been issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission to various members of the Wall Street elite, not
a few of whom have been practicing attorneys or have at least obtained a law degree. These events have thrown wide the casements
and allowed a view through the usually closed windows of the
tightly-knit world of Wall Street. There are astronomical financial
gains to be made and great power to be had on Wall Street, and
fortunes are won or lost in hours if not minutes.
Into this whirlwind, and as topical as today's headlines, is Greed
and Glory on Wall Street: The Fall of the House of Lehman by Ken Auletta.
After compiling hours of interviews with key personnel and reviewing countless articles and statistics, Mr. Auletta narrates in great detail the final days of Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, one of the most
prestigious, influential, elegant, and historically wealthy investment
banking firms. 2 It is a fascinating account which literally opens a
1 See generally A Raid on Wall Street, TIME, Feb. 23, 1987, at 64.
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4 (1986). The Lehman brothers, Henry, Emanuel, and Mayer, arrived in
the United States in late 1840 and established a trading and dry goods business in
Montgomery, Alabama. They moved operations to New York in 1868 and were
instrumental in founding the New York Cotton Exchange. Id. at 27-30. By 1967,
building on the success of raising capital for various southern ventures, Lehman
Brothers was worth 3.5 billion dollars in underwriting and was among the top four
investment banks. During the 1960's, Lehman Brothers began for the first time to
actively participate in the trading of commodities futures and commercial paper.
By July of 1983, Lehman Brothers was a powerhouse with an average of 15 million
dollars a month in pre-tax and pre-bonus profits and capital of 250 million dollars
with an equity of 175 million dollars. Id. at 4.
LEHMAN
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window on the obscurity of Wall Street for both the neophyte and
the experienced.
Prior to being swallowed by Shearson/American Express in
1984, Lehman Brothers had been a private partnership in the investment banking and trading field for nearly 134 years. 3 Mr.
Auletta's book relates the facts surrounding the disagreements and
heated opposition between the two co-chairmen/co-chief executive
officers, Peter G. Peterson and Lewis L. Glucksman, who were
charged with protecting and enhancing the partnership. Significantly, Mr. Auletta highlights the mutual distrust between the two
men, as well as the neglect and economic "blinders" exhibited by
the remaining boardmembers and partners at Lehman Brothers.
Mr. Auletta also refers to the splendor enjoyed by partners at the
usually profitable Lehman Brothers, including the sumptuously appointed oak paneled dining room, where a meal prepared by world
class chefs could be enjoyed on monogrammed china with sterling
silver utensils followed by the finest hand rolled cigars available.4
In 1973, Peter G. Peterson was made a partner at Lehman
Brothers, which at the time was in management chaos. 5 Mr. Auletta
indicates that two months after Peterson's partnership status was attained, he was elevated to the position of sole chairman and chief
executive officer. 6 He maintained those titles for the next ten
years. 7 According to Mr. Auletta, Peterson was not well liked and
was perceived as distancing and unapproachable. 8 Nonetheless, he
was able to restore Lehman Brothers to an efficiently run, cost effective, organized, and highly profitable investment banking firm.9
Peterson was perceived as a "Mr. Outside." He sat on various
3 Id. at 210.
4 Id. at 40-41, 87-88.
5 In 1973, Lehman Brothers began losing money at the alarming and frighten-

ing rate of nine million dollars annually, costs were completely out of control, and
Lehman Brothers had just been censured by the New York Stock Exchange for
"sloppy" record keeping. Id. at 34. Peterson, Secretary of Commerce in the Nixon
Administration, was courted as a savior. He was to engage in cost cutting and belt
tightening practices. Id. at 35-40.
6 Id. at 40.
7 Peterson's resignation was demanded in a meeting with his then co-chairman/co-CEO Lewis Glucksman in July of 1983. Id. at 21-24.

8 Peterson, it is said, would call partners at odd hours, ask them to ride uptown
in his limousine, and then ignore them as he talked on the phone or read a memo.
He was seen as imperious and a name dropper. Peterson lectured Glucksman
about the stains on his ties, obesity, unfashionable clothes, and the proper image
for the firm. It is also said that at one board meeting, he complained of a headache
and ordered a fellow partner to run out and get him some aspirin. Id. at 16, 69, 83,
84.
') Id. at 3, 41-44.
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corporate boards, was involved with the State Department due to his
former position in the federal government, and was quite active politically.' 0 He was the archetypical "Wall Street Banker," and if he
was sympathetic to either of the factions developing at Lehman
Brothers, it was to the "Bankers.""
On the opposing side, the quintessential "Trader," and the titular head of the other faction at Lehman Brothers, was Lewis
Glucksman.' 2 He had come to Lehman Brothers some ten years
prior to Peterson, and in contrast to him, Glucksman worked his way
to the top of Lehman Brothers from department head to
boardmember and officer. 3 Throughout his rise, Glucksman maintained the same glass-enclosed office on the Lehman Brothers trading floor so that all of "his boys" could see him and be encouraged.
He was volatile, lugubrious, and unstinting in both praise and
blame, and was often described as a "wildman."' 4
Peterson and Glucksman symbolized the constant conflict existing between the bankers and traders. The banking division,
10 Peterson graduated summa cum laude from Northwestern University and became president of Bell and Howell at age 34. He was Secretary of Commerce in the
Nixon Administration, and was credited with saving Lehman Brothers from ruin in
1973 when he assumed control and aided in turning in five consecutive record
breaking profit years. Id. at 36-43. Currently, he sits on the boards of six "blue
chip" corporations, and is treasurer of the Council on Foreign Relations as well as a
trustee of both the Museum of Modern Art and the Japan Society. Id. at 14. He
accepted, enjoyed, and apparently expected to play the "ambassadorial" role with
clients, governments, the press, and John Q Public. Id. at 14-15, 74.
11 Peterson is quoted as saying that "the great successes of this company ...
[are] that the essence of this firm has been in creative entrepreneurial work, and not
in other areas, such as trading, etc." Id. at 54. (emphasis added).
12 Raised on Manhattan's upper west side during the depression, Lewis Glucksman graduated from DeWitt Clinton High School. He spent a year at Indiana University, transferred to the College of William and Mary, and obtained a liberal arts
and accounting degree in 1947. Id. at 45. He first worked as a credit reporter with
Dun and Bradstreet, received an M.B.A. from New York University night school,
and began work for A.G. Becker as a securities analyst. He then became an arbitrager, returned to A.G. Becker as co-manager of the Commercial Paper Division,
and was eventually "lured" to Lehman Brothers in 1962 to begin Lehman Brothers'
own Commercial Paper Trading department. Id. at 45-46.
13 Id. at 17, 45, 74, 76.
14 Glucksman was THE Trader-he arrived at his desk before six each morning,
his tie already askew, his pants soon dusted with cigar ash, and his fingers stained
from newsprint. Proudly wearing an inexpensive Seiko watch with a plain band, he
always ate lunch at his desk, and never in the Partners' dining room, where "they"
(the bankers) were always to be found. Id. at 12. He would redden with rage, burst
buttons on his shirt, or heave objects across the room in frustration, and just as
easily hug and kiss his employees to express his gratitude. It was said he once
ripped his shirt off his back while in a rage and tore down curtains from the windows. He was also seen, however, as a very caring man, very emotional, and very
smart. Id. at 13.
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though accounting for only one-third of the total revenues at Lehman Brothers, nonetheless maintained power and control by having
a clear majority on both the board of directors and in the partnership roles. 5 According to the traders, bankers received too high a
share in the profits for doing less work, and were never "down in
the trenches" where the trading was going on and where the real
work was being done. The bankers, meanwhile, viewed the traders
as inelegant and unable to understand the rich history and tradition
behind nurturing clients and procuring capital. 6
After detailing the incongruous backgrounds and positions of
Peterson and Glucksman, Mr. Auletta noted that the stage was set
for imminent disaster. In early 1983, Glucksman was elevated to cochairman and co-chief executive officer. Among other reasons,
Glucksman's appointment hopefully would mollify existing tensions. 1 7 Glucksman shared titles with Peterson, but was in reality
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the firm.' 8 Glucksman,
"Mr. Inside," who deplored the Ivy League air cultivated by Peterson, soon began acting without consulting with his co-chairman.' 9
Peterson, meanwhile, was only three years away from mandatory retirement and the resulting forced divestiture of his partnership
shares.2 0 An open confrontation or schism would only devalue
15

Id. at 12, 17-18.

Tensions inevitably arose between the "Bankers" and the "Traders." Basically, a trader buys and sells securities, that is, bonds, stocks, options, financial futures, commercial paper, certificates of deposit, Treasury bills, and Eurobonds,
either for clients (thereby generating fees and commissions for the firm), or by risking the firm's money directly. A trader makes quick firm decisions, often by consulting a puzzling array of numbers on a computer monitor, before, during, and
after hurried telephone calls.
Conversely, bankers supposedly have a longer view, extending to the horizon.
A banker invests several years in nurturing and cultivating a relationship before it
becomes a client. They earn fees for serving as financial consultants to corporations, for pulling together new issues, and for merging or divesting companies.
Traders are drawn as poorly educated drones with "digital" minds, robots sitting mesmerized before glowing screens, crassly spitting out orders through cigarclenched teeth, thinking only of the moment, and animal-like. Bankers are likewise
stereotyped. They are shown as elitist "Ivy League" preppies in suspenders who
would rise late, take long lunches, deftly work over contracts, but not produce a
product. This schism was developed at Lehman Brothers due to the historical lack
of trading practices-Glucksman's arrival in the 1960's was the first significant trading done at Lehman Brothers. Thus, there existed the constant "Us v. Them" philosophy. Id. at 11, 53-54.
16

17
18

Id. at 74.
Id. at 17.

19 Id. at 77-82.
All partners at Lehman Brothers had to commence selling back shares to the
partnership once they reached age 60. Peterson, at the time of the May 1983 meeting was 57. Id. at 17. The rumor mill was producing talk of a sale of the partner20
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those shares and an intermediary was used so that the two heads of
Lehman Brothers would at least communicate. 2 1
In July of 1983, after years of pent up frustration, Glucksman
22
demanded that Peterson resign without the usual transition phase.
Peterson complied and did not offer a struggle, but the price of
peace was high-a multi-million dollar "golden handshake"-which
became the first death rattle of the painful demise of Lehman
Brothers.23
Money and power and the unquenchable thirst for more were
the prime motivating factors behind the demise of Lehman Brothers. According to Mr. Auletta, both were easily attainable. For example, in the fall of 1983, an average partner at Lehman Brothers
had an equity of 2.3 million dollars. An average senior partner with
some 2000 shares (about one-fifth of the partners owned that
amount) made pre-tax income equal to two million dollars.2 4 Power
was just as easily attainable.
Indeed, the chairman and
25
boardmembers set the amount of bonuses for each partner.
Therefore, the higher Glucksman could rise, the closer to the actual
reigns of power and control he would be.
It was his need for power and money, and more of the same,
which led to the series of events which culminated in the takeover
and purchase of Lehman Brothers by Shearson/American Express.
Although Peterson resigned control without a fight, he did not physically leave Lehman Brothers until months after, which rankled
Glucksman even further and increased tension. 26 Boardmembers
ship and that Peterson was actively pushing for a sale prior to his 60th birthday to
reap the maximum amount possible. Id. at 61-62.
21 Glucksman's overbearing hate and Peterson's seeming inability to talk to him
led to the use of one of the partners as an intermediary to pass messages between
the two men. Id. at 69.
22 Id. at 101-03.
23 Peterson withdrew nearly his entire seven million dollar equity at once, rather
than over the mandatory two and one-half to five year pay-off period. His bonus
was as big as Glucksman's September bonus (annual bonus time). Peterson continued to receive one percent of the firm's profits for the next five and one-half years,
and received $300,000 annually for five and one-half years as " 'supplemental retirement benefits.' " Further, Lehman Brothers invested five million dollars in Peterson & Jacobs, Peterson's new venture capital firm. Id. at 107. If Lehman
Brothers was sold within the next five and one-half years, Peterson would receive
the same premium (the value offered shareholders above the worth of their stock)
on the sale. The premium would decline after two and one-half years. Thus, Peterson now had a stake in a quick sale of Lehman Brothers. In return for this deal,
Peterson was to do nothing but resign. Id.
24 Id. at 5-6.
25 Id. at 127.
26 Id. at 121, 123.
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and partners at Lehman acquiesced totally to Glucksman's sole leadership as well as the multi-million dollar severance to Peterson.2 7
After Glucksman assumed sole control, including control of the
awarding of bonuses, a serious realignment took place.2 8 Traders,
now that one of their own was in power, began receiving more and
larger bonuses with a greater number of traders elevated to partnership status. This shake up, according to the bankers, was at their
expense. Ultimately, all of the partners became more concerned
with the total capitalization of Lehman Brothers; that is, the value of
their individual 2 °shares rather than with the welfare of the partnership as a whole .

This attitude, together with the climate of general

losses on the Street at that time and the deepening sense of chaos,
led to the inexorable fall and inevitable sale of Lehman Brothers to
Shearson/American Express. 30
27 At the board meeting when Peterson announced his resignation and the
"Golden Parachute Agreement," none of his potential supporters spoke up. All
acquiesced, except for boardmember Peter Solomon, who indicated in loud terms
that the idea was "nuts" and that all of the boardmembers' investments in the partnership were being placed in extreme risk. Id. at 107. At the July 26, 1983 partnership meeting at which Peterson resigned, although the 76 non-boardmember
partners were "stunned" after Peterson's announcement, they evinced the attitude
that it was a "fait accompli" and that nothing could be done. It apparently was
clear that, in light of the bonus time fast approaching, any rebels in the camp would
be remembered. The board was primarily focused on the money and profits the
firm was realizing, not on its future or its past traditions, or the loyalty to its members. Silence reigned. Id. at 102-03. No one doubted, however, that as the sole
CEO, Glucksman would use the power of the office. Id. at 112-14.
28 Id. at 127-29, 131-38.
29 Lehman Brothers was filled with the "every-man for himself" attitude. Personal ambition and greed are essential to the overall success of any investment
banking firm. However, other factors such as teamwork, commaraderie, leadership,
and a common tradition play vital roles. According to Auletta, Lehman Brothers
overemphasized individual greed, that is, "blood money," and no emphasis was
placed on common goals of the firm as a whole. Id. at 138-39.
Further, to make the trades which are necessary, a large capital base is needed.
A large base is also insurance against sudden losses. Amid the chaos and losses
being registered, the partners were in a state of near panic. They feared that Lehman was undercapitalized, and that soon its value as a partnership on the auction
block and any return to the partners from the sale, would be made only in terms of
losses. The stage was set for the push to sale. Id. at 47, 138-39.
30 Many partners pushed for sale of the firm so that they could all become instant millionaires. According to the author, other factors regarding the sale of the
firm were greed, lack of confidence in Glucksman, unhappiness, and worries about
the adequacy of capital. The purchase price of Lehman Brothers was $360 million
with an aggregate cost of $380 million due to advances and "pot sweeteners." Id.
at 224. As a result of the sale, the average junior partner netted anywhere from
$500,000 to $1 million. This did not include any incentive bonuses to remain with
Shearson/American Express after the sale.
Following the sale, Glucksman netted $15.6 million, and became a consultant
with Shearson/American Express at a substantial annual salary. Id. at 220. Peter-
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Mr. Auletta's book raises issues which are particularly topical,
chiefly that of the responsibility of partners to the partnership as a
whole. The law of partnerships and the fiduciary duties of the partners is quite clear.3" The question is raised, however, whether the
best interests of the Lehman Brothers partnership and its clients
were served. Mr. Auletta's book indicates that both boardmembers
and partners acquiesced totally and complacently to the ouster of
Peterson and his multi-million dollar severance check. Further,
when losses began to be felt in late 1983 and early 1984 at Lehman
Brothers and throughout Wall Street, neither the partners nor
boardmembers were concerned with cost cutting measures or the
survival of the partnership. Rather, they were calculating the total
capitalization of Lehman Brothers as it affected the value of their
individual share holdings. They seemed far more interested in realizing as much personal gain as possible, rather than insuring the
survival of the partnership.
Was the conduct of the partners actionable fiduciary neglect? A
full answer may never be had, but it is quite clear that the prime
motivating force behind the sale of Lehman Brothers was the desire
for wealth. Even assuming fiduciary neglect, however, it is doubtful
that policies of any governing body such as the Securities and Exchange Commission would have any significant deterrent effect.
The desire for wealth is part of the American Dream. The most recent news reports are indicative of its pursuit despite laws to the
contrary. Significantly, despite the supposed rich history and long
son received about $6 million on top of the $7 million severance pay. He also
received $200,000 per year for the remainder of his severance contract, plus
$650,000 which both he and Glucksman received in the fall of 1983 as a one percent profit bonus. He also received a 1.5 million dollar bonus in 1983 and a 1.5
million dollar retirement benefit for a total of about 18 million dollars. He actually
received $23 million if one counts the five million dollars invested by Shearson in
Peterson's new firm. Id. at 221.
31 The partnership relationship is one of a fiduciary character, such that an obligation exists among all partners to conduct themselves with the utmost good faith
and loyalty to the partnership. See D. FESSLER, ALTERNATIVES TO INCORPORATION
FOR PERSONS IN QUEST OF PROFIT 97 (1980). In accord with this relationship, partners are required to fully disclose information that would be material and significant to the life and fortune of the partnership. Id. Indeed, partners are trustees of
the partnership, and the trust relationship extends not only to the financial assets of
the partnership but to its business opportunities. Id. at 100.
Finally, the Uniform Partnership Act, codified in many states, and serving as a
significant guideline in the remaining states, indicates that partners are fiduciaries
and must render all information regarding the partnership, or on matters affecting
the partnership to the partners. See, e.g., N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 20, 43 (McKinney 1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:1-9, 1-20 (West 1940). The act also indicates that
each partner is held accountable to the partnership for any profits made with regard to business conducted on behalf of the partnership.

1987]

BOOK REVIEW

503

tradition of Lehman Brothers, as one partner stated, the sale was a
tragedy and only "because the business was not sold at the optimal
time" and therefore did not realize an optimal price.3
Greed and Glory on Wall Street: The Fall of the House of Lehman, is
thus highly recommended, although more input from the "nonpartner" viewpoint would have been appreciated. Nonetheless, the
book is a fascinating account and is as topical as the current issue of
the Wall Street Journal.
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